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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

COLLIN L. HANSEN, the duly appointed,
acting and qualified administrator of
the estate of Bernard Hansen, deceased,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No,

vs.

14112

DELLA A. CHRISTENSEN, the duly appointed
and acting and qualified administratrix
of the estate of Arnold Christensen,
deceased and DELLA A. CHRISTENSEN,
individually,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff in the above entitled matter brought this
action to compel specific performance by the sellers under
a real estate contract covering approximately 137 acres
of land in Box Elder County, Utah, under ivhich contract
the plaintiff buyers were in default in the payments as
well as in the payment of taxes.

Plaintiff's contention

isDigitized
that
depositing
a J.cashier's
check
by theby
Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
Reuben Clark Law School,
BYU. in the amount of
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-2$2,422.00 with one J. Leo Nelson, vice-president of a bank
on November 1, 1962, entitled them to a deed notwithstanding the first payment on the contract was made eight
months late and the second, and third and final payments
had never been made, the final payment being delinquent
t\^enty-two months and no taxes having been paid for
almost four

years by the plaintiff.

Defendants contend

the contract was terminated by Plaintiff's breaches under
its terms, and that no proper tender of performance could
have been nor was made sufficient to justify the court
ordering specific performance of the contract.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Box Elder County, Judge VeNoy
Christoffersen presiding, ruled that it was up to the
defendants to give notice of default and exercise one
of her options prior to November 1, 1962, and that the
deposit at a bank of a cashier1s check on that date was
a valid tender of full performance, and ordered defendants
to convey the land to plaintiff.

The court further

awarded plaintiff $700.00 attorney's fees.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the lower court's

order

for specific performance, the plaintiff having been long
in default of the contract, that the purported tender
of performance was not timely made, was inadequate as a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3- •
tender and was insufficient to cover the amount
delinquent, and finally to reverse the lower court's
award of attorney's fees to plaintiff, the party breaching the contract.

.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 1, 1958, Arnold and Delia A. Christensen
entered into a contract to sell to Bernard Hansen and
Hansen to purchase from Christensen 137.1 acres sometimes
referred to as the muskrat farm (Tr. Page 15-Line 16)
involved in this lawsuit.

The contract, (Plaintiff's

Exhibit No. 1) provided that the purchase price was to
be $4,000.00 payable $1,200.00 upon execution of the
contract, receipt for which was acknowledged and the
balance to be paid $900.00 plus accrued interest on January
1, 1959, $900.00 plus accrued interest January 1, 1960
and $1,000.00 plus accrued interest on January 1, 1961.
Hansen agreed to pay promptly, when due, all taxes and
assessments levied upon the property from and after
January 1, 1958.

The parties agreed that time was of the

essence and the acceptance of payment other than according
to the terms of the contract was in no way to alter the
terms of the contract as to forfeiture therein before
mentioned.

(Emphasis Added).

Hansen was given 90 day

grace period and the agreement was that in the event any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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default in payment of principal, interest, taxes,
or other failure to comply with the contract,
Christensens were given all remedies provided by
law, without election among them, and in addition had
options (1) to declare the entire amount of principal
and interest immediately due and payable and proceed
to foreclose their grantors lien, (2) the right to
enter upon and take possession of said real property
together with all improvements thereon, (3) terminate
the contract in which event any payments theretofore
made became forfeited to the grantors and the grantors
were to be released of all obligation whether in law
or equity to convey said property.
Upon the final payment of principal and interest,
taxes and assessments, when the same became due, and
upon full performance by Hansen of all of the terms
and conditions and provisions of the agreement, nthen
and in that event the grantors, (Christensens) agree
to execute and deliver to the grantee, warranty deed
covering the above described real property."

(Emphasis

Added).
On September 8, 1959, $900.00 principal and $168.00
interest was paid by Hansen (receipt part of plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 5 ) , but nothing was paid on taxes.

By every-

one's admission all taxes were paid from January 1958
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-5through the date of the law suit by the Christensens.
(Tr. 94-29),

On October 31, 1962, Collin Hansen, a

son of the deceased Bernard Hansen went to the
Christensen Home as he said, to find out how much
was owing, compute the interest and to make a check
to the Christensens (Tr. 32-19).

No money or check

was tendered to the Christensens at that time.
33-7).

(Tr.

The Christensens testified that Collin Hansen

said he was there to make a payment on the land, had
no check made out and never did offer any specific
amount either of cash or a check to the Christensens.
(Tr. 58-24; Tr. 67-18).

At that time Hansen was no-

tified that the Christensens had terminated the contract
sometime in the past and there was no further contract
between the parties.

(See also Tr. 30-12).

Christensens

continued to use the ground in about the same manner
as before the contract, that is, for hunting, pasturing,
and layout ground though the particular federal program
had ended.

(Tr. 71 and 72).

On the next day a letter (Plaintiff1s Exhibit No.
2) was sent by Collin Hansen's attorney advising Delia
Christensen that she could go to the office of J. Leo
Nelson in the First Security Bank, Brigham City Office,
and there pick up a cashier's check for $2,422.02 in
exchange for deeds from the administratrix of Arnold
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Christensen and a deed from Mrs. Christensen.

Aside

from the phone call or calls between the said J. Leo
Nelson and Delia Christensen, nothing of significance
was done by the Hansens (concerning the contract) or
to appoint an administrator for Bernard Hansen's
estate until 1974.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE BEING A REMEDY OF EQUITY, ONE WHO
INVOKES IT MUST HAVE CLEAN HANDS IN HAVING DONE EQUITY
HIMSELF.
This Court's holding in the case Fischer vs. Johnson
No. 13530 dated August 6, 1974, and reported in 525 Pac
2nd 45 appears to be controlling of similar if not identical issues in this case.

In the Fischer Case the lower

court had granted specific performance to a defaulting
buyer and this court used the following language:
"But it is also true that specific performance
is a remedy of equity; and one who invokes it must
have clean hands in having done equity himself.
That is, he must take care to discharge his own
duties under the contract; and he cannot rely on
any mere inconvenience as an excuse for his failure
to do so. Even if inconvenience or difficulty is
/•/.- encountered, he must make an effort to perform, or
to tender performance, which manifests reasonable
diligence and a bona fide desire to keep his own
promises."
The court further rejected in the Fischer Case
the plaintiff's contention that a notice stating that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7plaintiff's were ready and willing to enter into and
perform the purchase contract as planned was an
attempt with reasonable diligence and good faith to do
what the agreement required of them.

In the instant

case the record is void of any attempt, offer or even
contact by the plaintiff from September 8, 1959 to
October 31, 1962, and no taxes had ever been paid or
offered from 1958 on. As stated by this court in the
Fischer Case,
'The plaintiffs having so failed-to put themselves
in the position to demand specific performance, the
judgment and decree to that effect cannot properly
be sustained POINT II.
THE PARTY GUILTY OF THE FIRST BREACH OF CONTRACT
CANNOT COMPLAIN IF THE OTHER PARTY THEREFORE REFUSES
TO PERFORM.
"Although originally rightfully in possession
under a contract for the purchase of land, the
character of the purchasers possession changes and
becomes tortious, at the option of the vendor, when
the purchaser disaffirms the contract, disavows the
title under which he has entered, refuses payment
of the purchase money, or otherwise fails or refuses
to comply with the terms of the conract, and he then
becomes liable to eviction as a trespasser. Immediately upon the purchasers failur to comply with the
terms of the contract the vendor may treat him as a
trespasser and sue to recover the possession.fr
55 Am Jur Vendor and Purchaser Section 438. See
also 17 Am Jur 2nd Contracts Section 365.
The above language was quoted almost verbatim by this
court in the case of Lynch vs. McDonald 367 Pac 2nd 464;
Digitized
by the 2nd
Howard427.
W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8While there may be many cases holding that when the
option to declare the entire balance due on the default
of a purchaser and to sue for the entire balance, a notice
of such election must necessarily be made by the seller, s
such \tfould not seem to be the case where termination of
the contract is the object and nothing further is required
from the buyers.
A Montana Case, Hammond Dodson Company vs. Slattery
216 Pac 323 holds no prior notice is necessary where cancellation of the contract is sought, the suit itself being a
sufficient election, and a similar result was reached in
Rauch vs Zender 138 Wash 610 245 Pac 17.
POINT III
NO PROPER TENDER EXCUSING PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO PERFORM
HAS BEEN MADE.
!r

A mere offer to pay does not constitute a valid
tender, the law requires that the tenderer have
the money present and ready and produce and actually
offer it to the other party. Tender implies the
physical act of offering the money or thing to be
tendered, but this cannot rest in implication alone.
The law requires an actual present physical offer;
it is not satisfied by a mere spoken offer to pay,
which although indicative of a present possession
of the money and the intention to produce it, is
'unaccompanied by any visible manifestation of intention
to make the offer good.1' 52 Am Jur Tender Section 7.
Clearly there was no tender on October 31, 1962.
As to whether or not a tender was made by the
writing of a letter from plaintiffTs attorney advising
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-9Christensens that a cashiers check was available to
them in the office of J. Leo Nelson in the First
Security Bank, Brigham City, must be answered in the
negative for the following reasons:
First;

The offer by letter to pay, unaccompanied by

the money, is no more than a mere spoken offer to pay
and not accompanied by any visible manisfestation of
intention to make the offer good.
actual present physical offer.

The law requires an

It is impossible to

construe the letter of Mr. Mann as a tender.
Second;

The tender was conditioned upon the Christensens,

residents of Bear River City as set forth in the contract,
traveling to a different city when the terms of the
contract provided for the payment to the Christensens.
Third;

The provisions of the contract were independant,

that is, the obligation of the Hansens to pay in full
promptly when due or within 90 days thereafter all principal, interest and taxes, were all conditions precedent
to the agreement of the sellers to execute and deliver
to the grantee a warranty deed.

5 5 Am Jur Vendor and

Purchaser Section 105 covers this problem and contains
the following language:
"The order of time in which the parties are to
perform is a most material consideration in
determining whether the agreements are dependant
or independant. --Where by the contract, payment
is to precede conveyance, a tender of a deed is not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-10necessary to an action for the purchase price.
The broad rule has been lain down that if the time
of payment must or may happen before the time for
conveyance arrives, performance of the agreement
of the vendor to convey is not a condition of the
purchasers agreement to pay and accordingly, the
vendor has a right to sue without an offer on his
part to convey. --The promise of the purchaser to
pay has been held in some cases to be independant
of the performance of the vendors promise to convey
where the contract provides that the vendor will
convey !after1 the payments or if the purchaser
shall !first* pay.
The language of the contract in question here, makes it
clear that buyer must timely perform and must pay when
due all taxes, interest and principal before the sellers
agreement to execute and deliver a warranty deed arises.
POINT IV.
THE CHECK HELD BY THE BANKER WAS INSUFFICIENT IN AMOUNT
TO COVER THE DELINQUENT BALANCE
Uner the terms of the contract there became due on
January 1, 1959, $900.00 principal and accrued interest
at 6% per annum from the date of the contract to-wit:
$168.00.

Since nothing was paid en January 1, 1959

there was a total unpaid balance of $2,968.00 which
would likewise draw interest at the rate of 61 per
annum (See 15-1-1 UCA, and Farnworth vs. Jensen 117
Utah 494; 217 Pac 2nd 571) wherein this court held,
!T

A vendor is entitled to interest upon unpaid
installments of interest as though it had been
paid to him and he had reloaned it."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-11T.his would equal $.4878 per day from January 1,
1959 to September 8, 1959, ($122.43) making a total
unpaid balance on September 8, 1959 of $3,090.43.

In

fact there was only $1,068.00 paid leaving a $2,022.43
balance.

Since there was another payment due on January

1, 1960 of both principal and accrued interest, the above
said balance would draw interest of $37.89 and should be
added making a total of $2,060.32 as the unpaid balance
on the contract as of January 1, 1960. At 6% on this
balance there would be an additional- sum of $123.61 for
the interest due on January 1, 1961, which when added
to the previous principal makes a total of $2,183.93 due
January 1, 1961, the date for final performance of the
contract.

The interest at 6% on that sum, from January

1, 1961 until November 1, 1962 would be $240.20 for a tota
amount due of principal and interest of $2,424.13.

In

addition to this the taxes for 4 years totalling $25.16
with interest of $3.42 thereon, would have to be added
in order to determine the amount owing under the contract,
to-wit: $2,452.71.

Plaintifffs check was for only

$2,422.02.
52 Am Jur Tender, Section 22 says:
"As a general rule, a tender must include everything
to which the creditor is entitled, and a tender of
any less sum is nugatory and ineffective as a tender,
--It must include interest due, costs, etc.
. It
is the duty of the debtor to make sure that his tende
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-12is sufficient in amount, and ordinarily it is
immaterial that he did not know the correct amount,
or believed that his tender was adequate in amount.
He acts at his peril and must see to it that his
tender is sufficient in amount; any deficiency in
amount is at his peril.ff
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
DEFAULTING PLAINTIFF.
Following the reasoning of this court in Fischer
vs. Johnson, and Lynch vs. McDonald, Supra, it would
appear clear that plaintiff was not entitled to specific
performance, was himself the only defaulter, and there
being no suggestion even that the defendant was at any
time in default it would appear there could be no basis
for awarding plaintiff $700.00 or any sum as attorneyTs
fees.

The contract called for final payment of prin-

cipal and interest, taxes and assessments, when the
same became due, all of which provisions plaintiff
ignored for at least 22 months and for as much as four
years.

To rei^ard such prolonged indifference and

ignoring of promises by plaintiff with $700.00 attorney!s
fees is error.

CONCLUSION
The purported tender in this case of a cashier's
check at a place foreign to the place of contract, in an
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-13amount insufficient to cover the obligations, including
interest and taxes, conditioned upon the delivery of deeds
to purported heirs or an administrator yet to be appointed,
coming at a time when plaintiff had been in default for
four years in the payment of taxes, was 34 months delinquent
in one payment and 22 months delinquent in the final
payment due under the contract, does not permit the
view that plaintiff is in court with clean hands entitled
to specific performance, but rather compels the conclusion
that plaintiff having ignored his own.promises and responsibilities under the contract is entitled to no equitable
relief and no attorney1s fees.

Respectfully submitted,

Omer J. Call, Attorney at Law
26 First Security Bank Bldg.
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

